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Obama Administration officials have indicated that international cooperation will play a greater 
role in their national space policy than it did during the Bush administration. But they have not 
provided a clear and consistent logic specifying why the United States wants more space 
cooperation, what types of cooperation it will pursue, and how it will convince other countries to 
agree on, and comply with, accords that produce the desired policy results. Instead, their policy 
about space cooperation mixes elements from three different and somewhat contradictory 
strategic logics: a “Global Commons” logic, a “Strategic Stability” logic, and a “Space 
Governance for Global Security” logic. While each logic has attractive features, the Global 
Commons logic is unlikely to achieve significant results in a short period of time, while the 
Strategic Stability logic is more likely to promote competition, rather than cooperation. 
Following the Space Governance for Global Security logic could yield much larger dividends by 
using positive and negative forms of space cooperation to gain widespread support for the 
equitable rules and effective international institutions needed to address the central challenges 
identified by the 2010 National Security Strategy. 
 
 
The National Space Policy and posture reviews of the Obama Administration place much greater 
emphasis on international cooperation than did the George W. Bush administration.1 So far, 
though, the new administration has not articulated a coherent and compelling strategic concept to 
guide its pursuit of space cooperation. Department of Defense (DOD) officials have argued that 
the United States needs more informal cooperation because space is increasingly “congested,” 
“competitive,” and “contested.”2 State Department officials have used more diplomatic terms, 
saying that space is not only “congested,” but also “multifaceted” and “interdependent.”3 Each 
phrase reflects a different, somewhat contradictory way of defining the problem that space 
cooperation could help solve. Each also puts conceptual limits on the kinds of cooperation 
deemed worthy of serious U.S. consideration in ways that reduce the likelihood of international 
agreement on measures that would advance the administration’s main policy objectives in space 
and its overall national security strategy. 
 
This conceptual confusion may explain the gap between the Obama Administration’s declared 
interest in space cooperation and the lowest-common-denominator measures that it has endorsed. 
For example, the United States recently announced that it would begin providing pre-launch 
notification for commercial and civilian satellites, but not national security satellites, and only 
for “the majority” of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic 
missiles.4 This is a positive gesture, but it only partially fulfills the Hague Code of Conduct 
pledge made, but never implemented, by the Bush Administration. It falls far short of a pre-
launch and post-launch notification accord signed with Russia during the Clinton Administration. 
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Likewise, while stronger norms regarding responsible space behavior are a central element of the 
new National Space Policy, the United States has shown more interest in voluntary measures 
proposed by allies than in binding constraints on those countries whose space behavior most 
concerns the United States, and vice versa.5 Without knowing how such voluntary transparency 
measures and norms fit in overall U.S. national space policy and security strategies, it is hard to 
judge how likely they are to lead to more ambitious, robust, and effective forms of cooperation in 
the future. 
 
One way to think more strategically about the role of space cooperation in achieving U.S. 
objectives is to evaluate different ways of conceptualizing why it might be useful, what kinds of 
cooperation would be preferable, and whether other key countries are likely to agree to measures 
that will produce the desired results. Three strategic objectives represent a core of continuity in 
U.S. national space policy over time, despite major disagreements about what they mean in 
practice and how they should be pursued: (1) to secure the space domain for peaceful use; (2) to 
protect space assets from all hazards; and (3) to derive maximum value from space for security, 
economic, civil, and environmental ends. 
 
This paper analyzes the three strategic logics for space cooperation evoked by different policy 
ideas being used in the Obama Administration’s space and security policies. The Global 
Commons logic seeks more informal cooperation so that a multitude of self-interested space 
users can share a “congested” environment without causing unintentional harm. In the Strategic 
Stability logic, U.S. use of space is increasingly “contested” by states or non-state actors who 
might attack vulnerable space assets to offset U.S. military advantages. In this logic, the primary 
purpose of space cooperation is to minimize such attacks by increasing the negative 
consequences for attackers, reducing their potential benefits, and avoiding misperceptions. The 
Space Governance for Global Security logic centers on characterizations of space as 
“interdependent” and “multifaceted.” This logic emphasizes that the more different countries, 
companies, and individuals depend on space for a growing array of purposes, the more they need 
equitable rules, shared decision-making procedures, and effective compliance mechanisms to 
maximize the benefits that they all can gain from space, while minimizing risks from 
irresponsible space behaviors or deliberate interference with legitimate space activities. 
 
Each logic highlights important features of the evolving space arena, and each gives good 
reasons why greater international cooperation could help accomplish U.S. objectives at an 
acceptable level of risks and costs. Since the main goal of U.S. space policy in recent years has 
been to maximize U.S. military power and freedom of action in space, with commercial and 
civilian interests subordinated to that goal,6 most Americans and allies who argue for greater 
space cooperation use the Global Commons or Strategic Stability logics. Although the Global 
Commons logic has the widest appeal, emerging space environmental problems do not seem 
urgent enough to motivate much more cooperation than has already been achieved since this 
collective action rationale for cooperation gained adherents in the 1990s. Framing the case for 
space cooperation in environmental terms also obscures, and is obstructed by, conflicting 
security interests among different spacefaring nations. Using the Strategic Stability logic to build 
the case for more space security cooperation, on the other hand, intensifies the sense of urgency 
by exaggerating conflicting security interests. In doing so, though, it risks inadvertently 




The Space Governance for Global Security Logic broadens the rationale for cooperation to 
include the mutual positive gains that space users can achieve at lower cost through 
collaboration, as well as the negative benefits from reducing risks of inadvertent interference and 
deliberate attack. It offers a more compelling reason to increase policy coordination than the 
Global Commons logic does, and a more constructive context for space security cooperation than 
the Strategic Stability logic. Although the Space Governance for Global Security logic might 
encounter more initial political resistance in the United States than the other two logics, it is 
more likely to produce international agreements that accomplish the desired results. Domestic 
political resistance could be overcome by showing how space has become integral not only to 
modern U.S. military operations, but to all the major elements of the 2010 National Security 
Strategy’s vision for promoting security, prosperity, and shared values by building a just and 
sustainable international order in space as well as on Earth. 
 
 
Sustainable Management of Space as a Global Commons 
 
Domains, such as space, the high seas, the atmosphere, and Antarctica, that are considered 
“global commons” lie beyond the sovereign jurisdiction of any state, are governed by 
international law, and are available for all to use for the common good. This creates a right of 
access that does not exist for land, territorial waters, or airspace under a sovereign government’s 
control, at the same time that it strengthens the responsibility to respect other states’ interests. 
 
The 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST) provides the basic legal framework for managing space as a 
global commons. It designates space as the “province of all mankind.”7 It cannot be appropriated 
(Article II), but can be freely accessed “without discrimination of any kind,” and “on a basis of 
equality.” The exploration and use of space should be “for the benefit …of all countries, 
irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development” (Article I), and must be “in 
accordance with international law… and in the interests of maintaining international peace and 
security” (Article III). The OST further specifies that States Parties shall conduct space activities 
“with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States Parties.” They shall consult 
before doing anything that might cause harmful interference for other space users (Article IX), 
shall be liable for damage caused to others (Article VII), and shall help each other’s astronauts in 
emergencies (Article V). Neither the OST, nor any subsequent space law, though, provides 
detailed rules or an authoritative process for deciding what types of space activities are 
inconsistent with these principles, when the individual or cumulative usage of space might 
damage the common interests, and how the benefits from space activities should be shared. 
 
For collective action theorists, the global commons characteristic of space evokes Garrett 
Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons,” a class of coordination problems that arise when many 
short-sighted, self-interested users try to maximize their own gains from consuming a non-
excludable public good without regard for the net negative effects on other users, on finite 
resources, on the shared environment, and even on their own long-term benefits.8 As the 
commons becomes overcrowded and degraded, users must consume more just to get the same 
level of benefit, so a downward spiral begins that individual users are powerless to stop. 
Averting tragedy involves either the establishment of a central authority to make rules, verify 
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compliance, and respond to violations, or less formal self-regulation by enough users to ensure 
sustainability. Voluntary norms, transparency measures, and peer pressure can produce 
sustainable behavior if the users value their social relationships as much as they value their short-
term material gains from over-using or abusing the commons; if all users can be educated to 
understand that mutual restraint is essential to preserving their livelihood over time; or, if the 
common environment can tolerate a moderate amount of bad behavior without breaking down. 
Clear legal rules, effective verification, and well-resourced implementing organizations become 
more important when a weak sense of community leaves the users focused primarily on their 
own short-term cost-benefit calculations, when the sustainability of the global commons is under 
more serious threat, and when high rates of compliance are needed to protect it.9 
 
Despite the vastness of space, certain kinds of crowding and irresponsible use are already raising 
the risks that individual space users will inadvertently cause problems for each other. The two 
most commonly cited examples involve allocating orbital slots and radio-frequency (RF) 
spectrum so that one satellite’s transmissions do not interfere with a neighboring satellite’s 
operations, and minimizing orbital debris that could damage satellites or space vehicles. Because 
the most powerful actors would currently rather keep negotiation and implementation costs low 
and preserve flexibility than obtain high rates of compliance with effective and equitable rules, 
they have preferred relatively weak international coordination and self-governance mechanisms. 
But the inadequacies of this approach are apparent in both areas, and will likely get worse as the 
number and diversity of space users continues to grow, each wanting more from space and each 
able to have a greater impact, for better or for worse, on others’ space usage. 
 
Overcrowding is most severe in geostationary orbit (GEO), where satellites need substantial 
orbital separation so that the high-powered signals required to reach Earth do not interfere with 
neighboring satellites. Only a small number of satellites can fit in the equatorial arcs over the 
United States and other prime geographic locations.10 Resource constraints and interference 
problems are not increasing proportionally to satellite population growth because technological 
advances are enabling satellites to operate in closer proximity, use RF spectrum more efficiently, 
and coordinate movements to avoid affecting neighboring satellites. Still, the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) system for coordinating orbital slots and spectrum usage 
needs ongoing improvement to process registration applications more efficiently, reduce “paper 
satellites” (slots registered to non-existent satellites), and increase compliance with registrations 
and technical recommendations. As more new countries and companies gain the technological 
capability and financial resources to put satellites in GEO, pressure will mount to revisit a system 
that still allocates scarce orbital slots foremost on a “first come, first served” basis, more or less 
in perpetuity.11  
 
In addition to 1,100 active satellites, space is also littered with debris and defunct satellites, spent 
rocket stages, explosion or collision fragments, paint flecks, and other human-made objects that 
serve no useful purpose. The United States currently tracks more than 19,000 objects that are 10 
centimeters (cm) or larger, and experts estimate that there are another 300,000 objects in the 1 to 
10 cm range, each able to cause serious damage if it collides with a satellite at orbital speeds, 
plus millions or billions of very small objects that could degrade satellites or damage certain 




While collisions between space objects have been rare, several recent hits and near misses have 
increased awareness of the operational risks and complications caused by space debris.13 Of 
greatest concern is the possibility that a cascade of collisions—a series of hits creating ever 
larger numbers of debris and greater collision probabilities—could make some “valuable orbital 
regions increasingly inhospitable to space operations over the next few decades.”14 
 
Spacefaring countries have made gradual progress on debris mitigation. Beginning in the 1990s, 
the United States, the European Space Agency (ESA), and other spacefaring countries developed 
national guidelines to reduce the production of debris during launch and on-orbit operations, to 
move GEO satellites into graveyard orbits at the end of their service life, and to put defunct low 
Earth orbit (LEO) satellites into 25-year decay orbits. Following such best practices involves 
additional costs, complicates operations, and shortens the useful life of satellites. Therefore, 
national requirements, compliance, and enforcement levels vary. Some space-users, including 
China, still do not have national debris mitigation guidelines. 
 
To harmonize and strengthen national practices, the United Nations Committee on Peaceful Uses 
of Outer Space (UNCOPOUS) asked the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee 
(IADC) to develop international guidelines that were adopted by COPUOS in 2007 and endorsed 
by the UN General Assembly. The vague language still lets each space user and state decide how 
many design and operational changes are reasonable to limit debris production, minimize break-
up potential, reduce the probability of accidental collision, and avoid intentional destruction, 
especially in ways that produce long-lived debris. Since compliance with the guidelines is 
voluntary, it also remains weak. For example, only 11 of 21 GEO spacecraft that ended their 
service life in 2009 were disposed of properly.15 
 
The European Union (EU) has a parallel effort to promote responsible use of the space commons 
through a Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities. The code mainly reiterates principles that 
spacefaring countries have already endorsed in the OST and elsewhere, without adding greater 
clarity or new mechanisms to decide how those principles should be applied in controversial 
cases. The most significant additional behavioral guideline admonishes signatories to avoid 
actions that generate long-lasting space debris and those that otherwise damage or destroy space 
objects, unless done to reduce space debris or address imperative safety considerations. Such a 
norm might inhibit behavior driven by economic or prestige motivations, but security concerns 
would probably override environmental considerations. Furthermore, this way of defining 
“responsible” behavior stigmatizes the 2007 Chinese ASAT test, but not the United States use of 
a sea-based ballistic missile interceptor to destroy the malfunctioning USA 193 spy satellite on 
the implausible grounds that its fuel tank might present a human health hazard, an action that 
most neutral observers believe had a different, but equally negative, effect on space security.16 
Proponents will have a better chance of establishing new norms in space that reduce debris 
production and other irresponsible behavior if the rules are fair, if others exercise comparable 
restraint, and if the social disapproval campaign is coupled with positive efforts to address the 
underlying reasons why states might be tempted to pollute the space environment. 
 
As the space global commons becomes more congested, having fuller and more accurate 
information about the location and projected movements of space objects can help satellite 
operators know when the probability of a collision is high enough that scarce fuel should be 
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expended to move out of harm’s way. Space surveillance information can also be used to 
monitor space population growth and raise awareness about the need for more collective action 
to protect the space environment. The Obama Administration has made improving U.S. space 
situational awareness (SSA) a major priority; its budget proposal for 2011 increases spending on 
relevant programs by roughly 70 percent over the previous year.17 The rate of increase in 
cooperation in collecting, analyzing, and disseminating space surveillance information, though, 
has been much lower. 
 
The United States military owns and operates the most extensive network of optical and radar 
sensors, and has the most complete catalogue of space objects, but its space surveillance network 
(SSN) has limitations. It can generally only keep track of objects greater than 10 cm in diameter, 
has had no sensors in the southern hemisphere, has very limited deep-space tracking capability, 
and, until recently, only had enough analytical resources to watch for potential collisions 
involving human spaceflight missions, critical U.S. government spacecraft, and certain other 
satellites of interest. The public catalogue does not include many thousands of objects that the 
United States military is tracking, nor is the public data accurate enough to be useful for collision 
avoidance decisions. Commercial and foreign spacecraft operators can request more detailed 
information, but reviewing and processing their request can preclude timely answers. Other 
countries have some independent ability to collect additional space surveillance information that 
they can use alone or in conjunction with data from the public SSN catalogue, but none can 
duplicate the basic features of the SSN.18 
 
Since the 2007 Chinese ASAT test and the 2009 Cosmos-Iridium collision, the United States has 
taken steps to improve its own SSA, and to share more information with other space actors. It is 
adding new sensors to the SSN, such as a space-based surveillance satellite launched in 
September 2010 into a polar orbit from which it can scan all of GEO once a day. The Joint Space 
Operations Center of the United States Air Force has increased its analytical capabilities enough 
to do regular conjunction analyses for all active satellites against all objects in the catalogue. It 
has legal agreements to facilitate data sharing with 16 commercial entities, and is also exploring 
ways to better share space surveillance data and costs with friends and allies, starting with 
Europe.19 The United States military remains reluctant to share comparable information on a 
regular basis with countries that are not close friends. 
 
In sum, there are good reasons for conceptualizing space cooperation as managing a global 
commons so that a growing number of individual space actors can continue to use it in a safe, 
equitable, and sustainable manner, but there are also major reasons why framing the need for 
greater space cooperation in this way is unlikely to produce international agreements that make a 
major difference in outcomes. Interference from overcrowding and accidents caused by space 
debris have so far been low probability, low consequence events. This makes it hard to convince 
policy makers outside of the space community that they should devote significant time, money, 
and political capital to get more rapid international agreement on, and more widespread 
compliance with, stricter rules, wider information sharing, and better managerial processes. With 
ongoing wars and the global economic crisis, a 1-in-1,000 chance of a given satellite colliding 
with a chunk of space debris during a ten-year functional lifetime does not sound too bad.20 
Debris cascades could dramatically increase the future risks and costs of space operations, but 
7 
 
that would still pale by comparison with the consequences of global warming or rampant nuclear 
proliferation. 
 
If proponents of greater space cooperation truly believe that collective action problems like 
debris mitigation are the most important reason for cooperation, and if they are satisfied with the 
rate of progress on improving launch, operation, and disposal practices that has occurred over the 
past fifteen years, then continuing to frame the case for cooperation in these terms is a fine 
strategic choice. But if they believe that progress towards sustainability in managing space as a 
global commons has been inadequate, then they need to reconsider the preference for informal 
self-regulation over more formal and fully developed regulatory arrangements. And if they were 
hoping to use major successes in relatively uncontroversial types of technical space coordination 
as a way to build momentum for more significant cooperation on politically difficult space 
security issues, then they should think about how those larger, more politically sensitive issues 
are impeding low-priority technical coordination. 
 
Strategic sensitivities impede cooperation because many people whose decisions affect space, 
especially from U.S. and foreign defense policy communities, resist doing what would make 
sense for the long-term sustainable management of space as a global commons because they do 
not think about space in the same way that environmentalists, international lawyers, or collective 
action theorists do. People who believe that access to and use of space can be controlled for 
strategic gains relative to potential competitors sometimes invoke the “space as a global 
commons” phrase as a way to assert their own right to use space without interference from others 
without acknowledging that other users have similar rights, and that all rights in space confer 
corresponding responsibilities. An extreme form of this view argues that the United States should 
become a space hegemon to police the shared environment, protect peaceful uses, and prevent 
anyone else from accessing or using space for hostile purposes.21 Less extreme forms of 
adversarial thinking also impede functional cooperation by limiting willingness to share space 
surveillance information and restricting exports of technologies that could help with debris 
mitigation, space traffic management, and the optimization of scarce resources. The more such 
adversarial logic dominates decisions about space, the less likely U.S. or foreign decision-makers 
will be to forego short-term gains and future flexibility in order to protect space from 
environmental degradation and to avoid social disapproval. 
 
 
Marginal Space cooperation to Enhance Strategic Stability 
 
When space is seen in terms of military competition rather than environmental management, the 
logic for cooperation changes. Instead of assuming that players want to maximize their own 
absolute gains without regard to others, the starting assumption is that players want to maximize 
their relative power, even when that reduces their absolute gains or increases operational risks. 
The impetus for strategic cooperation, as conceived by early arms control theorists, such as 
Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin, comes from the one shared interest that potential 
adversaries have: avoiding mutual disaster.22 Competitors can use formal or informal cooperation 
at the margins of their relationship to stabilize strategic stability by ensuring that nobody believes 
they could gain more than they would lose by initiating an unprovoked attack; and by reducing 
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misperceptions, false alarms of impending attack, command and control failures, and other 
problems that could cause a nuclear war that neither side wanted. 
 
Space was one of the first arenas where the United States sought limited cooperation with the 
Soviet Union to enhance terrestrial deterrence stability. The United States wanted space 
designated as a global commons so that sending remote sensing satellites over Soviet territory 
would be tolerated in a way that spy planes were not. Satellite over-flights were accepted as 
peaceful, permissible, and thus, implicitly protected under the OST in the belief that imagery and 
communications from space were reducing the likelihood of war. Satellites were a non-intrusive 
way to get information about the superpower military balance and compliance with arms 
accords. They could provide early warning of actual attacks and calm unwarranted fears. They 
could also provide superpower leaders with better information and direct communication for 
crisis management and escalation control. 
 
In space law, very few national security activities have been explicitly prohibited (e.g. weapons 
of mass destruction in orbit and military uses of celestial bodies) or protected (e.g. satellites used 
to verify treaty compliance and for the crisis “hotline.”) Still, the superpowers tacitly tolerated 
each other’s use of space in stabilizing ways and practiced reciprocal restraint regarding 
destabilizing activities. Neither vigorously pursued dedicated ASAT options, nor put 
conventional weapons in space that could be used for pre-emptive attacks on strategic targets, 
although both engaged in some exploratory ASAT work as a hedge, and both had other latent 
retaliatory options if their satellite were attacked. Even after the Soviets conducted a series of 
dedicated ASAT tests during the Nixon Administration, the United States decided not to 
intensify its own ASAT development because this would be less likely to enhance deterrence of 
Soviet ASAT use than to stimulate an ASAT arms race that would disproportionately hurt the 
United States.23 As doubts about Soviet commitment to détente and deterrence stability grew, 
though, U.S. interest in reciprocal ASAT restraint declined. It disappeared altogether once the 
Reagan Administration decided that the most reliable way to increase terrestrial deterrence 
stability was to use space to enhance U.S. high-technology war-fighting advantages that could 
prevent the Soviets from thinking that they could gain more than they would lose by starting a 
nuclear war. 
 
Many analysts who currently favor limited space arms control to enhance strategic stability 
formed their security logic during the Cold War, and are adapting it to changed strategic 
circumstances. Instead of two superpowers with roughly equal nuclear, conventional, and space 
capabilities trying to compete for advantage without causing a nuclear war, now the central 
challenge from a U.S. perspective is to keep weaker players from being able to offset U.S. 
strategic advantages by threatening or using asymmetrical attacks against the space assets on 
which U.S. military power and economic prosperity disproportionately depend. Since it is 
unrealistic to expect that the United States could gain the level of comprehensive space 
dominance needed to physically preclude other countries from interfering with U.S. space 
operations, some U.S. strategists argue that the best way to avoid such attacks would be to 
persuade potential aggressors that any benefits from interference would be outweighed by the 




This is often called “space deterrence,” but the analogy with nuclear weapons is highly 
misleading. A more accurate and less pejorative term would be “space dissuasion,” because 
retaliatory threats against space or terrestrial targets would be of low credibility and limited 
utility compared with other ways of changing cost-benefit calculations. The most thoughtful 
studies emphasize dissuasion strategies that would be relatively non-threatening, such as making 
satellites less attractive targets, raising the political and legal costs of ASAT attacks, and 
underscoring that even limited interference with satellites could lead to mutual disaster by 
sparking a catastrophic collapse of global financial markets, for example, or causing a low-level 
conflict to escalate out of control.24 Even these studies, however, recommend that the United 
States develop some defensive capabilities that could also have offensive applications, increasing 
the likelihood that other space actors will seek to emulate or offset such U.S. strategic choices in 
ways that stimulate a downward spiral of weapons acquisition, tensions, and possible pre-
emptive action in a crisis or a war. 
 
Whereas Americans fear asymmetrical attacks on their superior space assets, the Russians and 
Chinese worry that U.S. space and missile defense advantages will cause the United States to be 
less cautious in regional crises that affect their interests.25 To draw global attention in the late 
1990s to these destabilizing effects of U.S. missile defense and space ambitions, the Russians 
and Chinese became increasingly vocal proponents for negotiating on “Prevention of an Arms 
Race in Outer Space” (PAROS) in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). This agenda item 
gained near universal support in annual UN General Assembly resolutions, but the United States 
vehemently objected that there was no Cold War-style arms race occurring in space, so no 
additional measures were needed.  
 
In 2008, Russia and China introduced a draft treaty that would extend the OST’s ban on WMD in 
space to prohibit placing all types of orbiting weapons there. It would also explicitly ban the 
threat or use of all types of force against space objects.26 Their “Prevention of the Placement of 
Weapons” (PPW) proposal has been widely dismissed as a propaganda ploy, in part because it 
would outlaw U.S. deployment of space-based missile defense interceptors (the main Russian 
and Chinese goal), but not prohibit debris-generating ASAT tests or prevent the proliferation of 
ASAT capabilities, the most important arms control objectives for other spacefaring states. The 
Bush Administration also objected that the dual-use nature of much space technology would 
make it impossible to define and verify a ban on space weapons without impeding the peaceful 
use of space.27 
 
U.S. proposals for cooperative steps to improve strategic stability in space have eschewed broad 
legal limits on capabilities in favor of dialogue and transparency and confidence-building 
measures (TCBMs). The Obama Administration has been trying to establish regular bilateral 
strategic stability talks with Russia and China covering nuclear, space, and cyber-security issues. 
The United States has also been calling on China, in particular, to be more transparent about its 
space programs, capabilities, and intentions. While the administration says that strategic dialogue 
would provide “mutual reassurance in the space domain,” its public remarks highlight advances 
in Chinese counterspace capabilities that concern the United States without acknowledging that 





Americans and Europeans often propose transparency measures as a low-risk way to test 
intentions and dispel misperceptions that could generate unwarranted suspicions, arms build-ups, 
and fears of attack. Other countries have a less favorable view of transparency for its own sake. 
While Russia and China have agreed to extensive and intrusive verification when necessary for 
high confidence in compliance with legally binding arms control treaties that serve their security 
interests, they have usually rejected requests to provide sensitive information without a legal 
agreement regulating its provision and use. That reluctance is partly cultural, but it is also 
strategic; the weaker player has greater reason to worry about sharing information that might 
reveal their vulnerabilities, especially in the absence of any constraints on the stronger player’s 
capabilities or actions. The United States probably also overestimates the reassurance value of 
minor TCBMs, like presentations on national space policies and expert visits to military satellite 
flight control centers, given the huge gap between U.S. military space capabilities and those of 
all other countries and the amount of classified information about U.S. military space spending, 
programs, and capabilities that would undoubtedly be excluded from these interactions. Despite 
such reservations, Russia has for several years sponsored a UN General Assembly Resolution 
calling upon states to propose outer space TCBMs “as a means conducive to… the prevention of 
an arms race in outer space.” Although all members of the EU co-sponsored this resolution in 
2009, the Obama Administration abstained because, at the time, it had not yet completed its 
space policy review. 
 
This review included a “blank slate analysis of the feasibility and desirability of options for 
effectively verifiable arms control measures that enhance the national security interests of the 
United States and its allies.”29 A “blank slate” implies that reviewers were directed to reconsider 
the anti-arms control principle added to the 2006 National Space Policy that the United States 
will categorically oppose “the development of new legal regimes, or other restrictions, that seek 
to prohibit or limit U.S. access to, or use of, space.”30 But long before the review was completed, 
participants had already announced that the United States will continue to “reject any limitations 
on the fundamental right of the United States to operate in, and acquire data from, space.”31 This 
sounds like a softer way of shutting off serious internal debate or international discussion about 
the net security effects of accepting new legal limits on U.S. freedom of action in order to get 
stronger legal protections for legitimate satellites and corresponding restrictions on other 
countries’ capabilities or actions that could threaten U.S. access to or use of space.32 The 2010 
National Space Policy does express a willingness to consider arms control proposals if they are 
equitable, effectively verifiable, and beneficial for national security, but it does not indicate that 
the United States should take any initiative to develop proposals fitting these criteria. And while 
the criteria sound reasonable, the formula also risks prematurely ruling out exploration of 
possible agreements that might not be fully verifiable, but that could nevertheless enhance the 
net security interests of the United States and its allies.33 
 
If the Obama administration did decide to propose some type of legally binding space arms 
control measure, the most likely option would be a stand-alone ban on kinetic energy ASAT 
tests. This idea was endorsed by a Council on Foreign Relations task force on U.S. nuclear 
weapons policy that included several current high-level DOD officials involved in the Obama 
Administration’s space policy reviews.34 Because of the indiscriminate risks that ASAT-
generated debris pose to military, intelligence, and commercial satellites, the United States has 
invested heavily in non-destructive means of temporarily disabling or permanently destroying 
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satellites performing hostile functions. Since it already has effective kinetic energy ASAT 
capabilities that could be used if other means would not suffice, the United States would give up 
little and gain a lot from a kinetic energy ASAT testing ban that prevented other countries from 
refining or acquiring this capability and protected the space environment at the same time. But 
proposing a stand-alone kinetic energy ASAT test ban would look just as self-serving as the 
PPW proposal does, in that it would provide additional protection for space objects, the main 
U.S. concern, but no new protections against space weapons, the main Russian and Chinese 
concern. 
 
If the United States wants to pursue a kinetic energy ASAT ban in a way that does not look like a 
propaganda ploy, then it needs a more balanced proposal that combines constraints on ASAT 
testing with measures to reduce motives for acquiring or using those weapons. Alexei Arbatov, a 
leading Russian arms control and security expert, has proposed a trilateral ban on testing ASATs 
and space-based missile defense interceptors as a practical, equitable, and verifiable form of 
limited space arms control.35 A more ambitious approach could build on an idea advanced by 
Canada to couple a voluntary or legally binding rule against weapons in space with a comparable 
rule against testing or using anything as a destructive ASAT, including another satellite.36 
 
Those who want greater strategic stability in space want better space surveillance capabilities for 
reasons beyond debris mitigation, collision avoidance, and efficient sharing of scare resources. If 
the central U.S. objective is to deter deliberate interference with U.S. space systems, then 
potential attackers must be convinced that the United States will know who to punish for 
interference, something that would be much more difficult to do in space than with a nuclear 
attack.37 Potential attackers might also be dissuaded if they knew that the United States would 
have enough warning to move a satellite out of harm’s way or take other protective actions to 
deny benefits from an attack. Improved space surveillance could help avoid crises and possible 
space conflicts that might arise if one state falsely accused another of attacking its satellite when 
the problem had actually been caused by an internal malfunction, a natural hazard, a piece of 
space debris, or a different space actor. It could also be used to verify compliance with space 
arms control agreements, such as a ban on testing or using destructive ASATs, or a rule requiring 
satellites to keep a specific distance away from each other, unless they had permission to conduct 
close proximity operations. 
 
The more emphasis that is placed on dissuading aggressive attacks, the more the United States 
will want superior SSA relative to potential attackers. But restricting routine SSA sharing to 
close friends and allies would drive a wedge between the “in group” and excluded countries, 
damaging relationships, generating suspicions, and reducing the amount of SSA information 
available for anyone to use for non-adversarial purposes. The more space stability is seen as a 
defensive security dilemma, the more interest the United States should have in sharing space 
surveillance information to reduce unwarranted fears, resolve ambiguities that could produce 
false alarms, minimize mutual incentives to acquire more destabilizing military space 
capabilities, and monitor compliance with cooperative accords. 
 
When applying the Strategic Stability logic to space, most U.S. defense analysts are missing the 
biggest reason why the United States should be willing to go beyond dialogue, transparency, and 
voluntary norms to stronger, more reliable forms of security cooperation—the connection to 
12 
 
nuclear weapons and terrestrial strategic stability. DOD officials engaged in the space policy 
reviews have said that the main reason why the Soviets never attacked U.S. satellites was 
because they believed that would lead to a nuclear war. These officials assume that adversaries 
will be less inhibited now because the United States would probably respond to most kinds of 
space interference with non-military or conventional means. In other words, increased nuclear 
strategic stability has decreased space strategic stability. 
 
Russian and Chinese arms control experts see a very different relationship between nuclear and 
space capabilities as they affect overall strategic stability. They argue that because the new U.S. 
strategic triad includes not only nuclear weapons, but also space-enabled precision conventional 
strike weapons and missile defense, it will be impossible to preserve strategic stability at 
progressively lower levels of nuclear weapons without addressing U.S. space and missile defense 
programs that Russia and China deem most threatening. Russian officials have repeatedly 
indicated that any follow-on negotiations to the new strategic arms reduction treaty signed in 
April 2010 (New START) must include some reliable reassurance that the Obama 
Administration’s “phased adaptive” global missile defense program will not evolve to undermine 
Russia’s nuclear deterrent, and that the West’s conventional precision strike capabilities will not 
require Russia to keep large numbers of tactical nuclear weapons. Since China’s nuclear 
stockpile still has fewer than fifty long-range weapons, it has even more need than Russia does 
for reassurance about U.S. missile defense and space capabilities and intentions before it will 
contemplate new constraints on, or reductions in, its nuclear arsenal. 
 
While space cooperation can make valuable contributions to strategic stability, it would be a 
mistake to use an adapted version of Cold War deterrence and arms control logic as the dominant 
way to conceptualize it.38 That logic assumed a fundamentally adversarial bilateral relationship, 
where the prime indicators of relative power (nuclear weapons and conventional forces) could be 
directly compared, and the only common interest lay in avoiding mutual nuclear disaster. None 
of those conditions hold in space. There, a growing number of states and non-state actors interact 
in complicated patterns using ambiguous systems that can have both military and non-military 
applications. Moreover, compatible interests have always been far more common in space than 
antagonistic ones. Making deterrence the dominant paradigm for space security would not only 
perpetuate Cold War-style nuclear relationships among the United States, Russia, and China, it 
would also unnecessarily recreate the same dangerous dynamic in space, where it would be much 
more difficult to avoid deliberate or inadvertent deterrence failures. At the same time, it would 
raise the costs of using space for commercial and civilian purposes, and impede the close 
cooperation that the United States needs from Russia, China, and a number of other spacefaring 
countries if it wants to achieve its highest priority objectives for security, prosperity, and world 
order. Therefore, while the United States should pursue cooperative steps that would increase 
both space and terrestrial strategic stability, it should frame its reasons for seeking space 
cooperation using a less adversarial, more ambitious, and more inclusive rationale. 
 
 
Space Governance for Global Security 
 
The Global Commons logic and the Strategic Stability logic are inadequate conceptual 
frameworks for producing international agreement and compliance with cooperative measures to 
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advance U.S. objectives in space because their rationales for cooperation are framed in narrow, 
negative terms: further minimizing risks of inadvertent interference and deliberate attacks on 
space assets. One way to gain more from space cooperation, more quickly and with less risk of a 
downward spiral, would be to frame the objectives of cooperation broadly, in both positive and 
negative terms, as Space Governance for Global Security. 
 
International relations theorists use the term “global governance” to describe institutional 
arrangements developed by sovereign state and non-state actors to do for the world what well-
functioning domestic governments do for their own citizens, but without establishing a world 
government with the power and authority to make and enforce rules, collect taxes, and allocate 
resources. Domestic governments provide protection against external and internal threats; public 
goods and services that private actors need to function and flourish, but cannot do effectively or 
efficiently on their own; and collective decision-making processes that members accept as 
legitimate. Strategies to promote global governance in a given issue area aim to approximate 
some or all of these functions by building on the existing patchwork of treaties, norms, 
diplomatic forums, intergovernmental organizations, market relationships, and transborder civil 
society networks. They aim to develop progressively more comprehensive and coherent 
arrangements to address shared problems more efficiently, effectively, and equitably than 
existing cooperative institutions can.39 Instead of assessing negotiation, verification, and 
compliance management only as “transaction costs” that participants will want to shirk or 
minimize, this logic also treats them as investments in building the knowledge, relationships, 
rules, monitoring capabilities, and joint decision-making mechanisms needed to support 
increasingly ambitious forms of cooperation. 
 
The “Space Governance for Global Security” logic starts from the premise that all current and 
future space users share the same strategic objectives attributed to the United States: to secure 
the space domain for peaceful use; to protect space assets from all hazards; and to derive 
maximum value from space for security, economic, civil, and environmental ends. If the goal of 
space cooperation is to maximize all participants’ interests in these shared objectives, then the 
benefits of cooperation become much larger and more compelling than in the other two logics. 
Modern space operations are much more expensive and technologically challenging than grazing 
cattle, and the diversity of interests and capabilities among space users is much greater than 
among the villagers sharing Hardin’s commons. Therefore, space cooperation should have the 
positive objective of organizing space users to work together and accomplish more for less than 
they could on their own, not just the negative objectives of minimizing inadvertent interference, 
environmental degradation, or deliberate attack. 
 
The United States space community has long understood the importance of having an 
inspirational vision to mobilize and sustain the high levels of public support and private 
investment needed for major space accomplishments.40 Instead of trumping up a new space race 
with China, or setting a multi-decade goal of going to a new planet in hopes of gaining 
unspecified insights into existential questions, technology and education spin-offs, and national 
prestige, it would be more realistic and compelling to frame a positive vision around using space 
cooperation to address urgent current terrestrial challenges. The 1999 Vienna Declaration on 
Space and Human Development highlighted how greater international cooperation and 
investment in space technologies could be leveraged to promote sustainable development, spread 
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the benefits of global communications, enhance natural disasters response, and improve health 
care and education in underserved regions.41 But, progress on this agenda has been slow because 
the countries with the most space assets and investment resources do not see such development 
projects as having a significant impact on their own well-being. A more persuasive case for 
space cooperation would be framed in terms of the positive contributions it could make to 
promote the security, prosperity, and values of the United States and of the other countries whose 
support will be essential for success. 
 
The 2010 National Security Strategy makes passing references to U.S. dependence on space 
systems that are vulnerable to disruption and attack, and to the need for strong multilateral 
cooperation to safeguard and optimize the use of space as a global commons. Space cooperation 
could be used more ambitiously in the overall strategy if it were conceived as a leading 
opportunity to build the global governance institutions needed to accomplish that strategy’s goal 
of creating a “just and sustainable international order that can foster collective action to confront 
common challenges.”42 
 
The central strategic challenge facing the United States is that the very elements on which its 
security, prosperity, and way of life depend—rapid technological innovation; a tightly 
interconnected global economy; and the free flow of people, goods, services, and ideas across 
borders—also increase its vulnerabilities both to deliberate attack and to unintentional dangers, 
such as a collapse in financial markets, pandemic disease, or climate change. To promote the 
positive aspects of globalization, while minimizing the risks, the National Security Strategy calls 
for using all elements of U.S. power to build a “rules-based international system that can 
advance our own interests by serving mutual interests.” As the most powerful player in the 
system, the United States wants rules to provide reassurance that weaker players will not exploit 
its vulnerabilities for asymmetrical attacks, that developing countries will behave responsibly 
rather than cut corners and cause problems for others, and that rising powers will want to join 
rather than change the status quo. But for this rule-based order to attract widespread support and 
sustained compliance, the United States must also provide credible reassurance that it will follow 
the rules itself, that it will not use its military and technological advantages in ways that harm 
others’ interests, and that it will support international governance arrangements that give others a 
meaningful voice in decisions that affect their security, prosperity, and way of life. 
 
Space epitomizes these current strategic challenges. It serves functions of vital importance for 
high-technology military operations, electronic financial transactions, power-grid operations, and 
countless other aspects of life in the information age. Yet, the space technologies needed for 
these beneficial purposes can also be deliberately or inadvertently misused in ways that threaten 
inherently vulnerable satellites and those who depend on them. Space is central to U.S. military, 
economic, and technological predominance; it matters greatly to countries who aspire to interact 
as equals with the United States; and it offers hope to those who have not yet benefitted much 
from globalization. Thus, there are both practical and symbolic reasons to choose space 
cooperation as a leading opportunity to provide mutual reassurance and to build effective global 
governance institutions. 
 
The drafters of the OST could see the outlines of this challenge half a century ago, even if they 
could not anticipate the details, so the treaty already includes the basic principles needed for 
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equitable and effective space governance. One reason why the George W. Bush Administration’s 
space policy raised foreign concerns was that a military competition to control space for U.S. 
national advantage would contradict these basic principles. The Obama Administration has re-
affirmed general U.S. support for the OST principles, but should be more specific about how it 
interprets those principles in light of recent controversies. It would be more reassuring, for 
example, if the United States explicitly declared that stationing weapons in space would be 
inconsistent with Article III’s directive that space be used for peaceful purposes, and that any 
type of interference with satellites operating in a manner consistent with the OST’s peaceful 
purpose clause would violate Article I’s equal access principle. If other spacefaring nations made 
parallel unilateral declarations, it would quickly reinforce existing legal commitments and 
longstanding norms against space weapons and ASAT attacks. U.S. willingness to begin 
negotiations on a companion document to the OST giving these norms full legal force and 
addressing more controversial questions about when the use of space for terrestrial warfighting 
should be protected or prohibited would provide powerful evidence that the United States is 
willing to accept mutually beneficial constraints, even in an area where it has a relative 
advantage. 
 
The OST and associated accords lack formal institutional mechanisms to promote international 
cooperation in the peaceful uses of space, to monitor compliance and resolve compliance 
problems, and to make collective decisions about the application of space rules in ambiguous or 
novel situations. There are international bodies that do, or could, discuss, negotiate, and/or 
implement different aspects of space cooperation. But all of these entities are weak, each focuses 
only on a subset of space issues, and there is little coordination or communication among them. 
Insisting that COPUOS concentrate on the peaceful uses of space and that military space issues 
only be dealt with by the CD makes no sense when the same technologies, and often the same 
satellites, can have both non-military and military functions, and when commercial or civilian 
satellites are more vulnerable to deliberate interference or ASAT debris than hardened military 
satellites are. Rules and decision-making processes designed when only a few governments 
could build and launch satellites for their own purposes must also be adapted for an era in which 
more than fifty countries have launched satellites on their own or in collaboration with others, 
and commercial space revenues have outpaced governmental space spending. Approaching space 
cooperation not in an ad-hoc, issue-specific way, but through a comprehensive process to 
improve overall space governance for global security, would direct attention towards developing 
decision-making and implementation bodies that have the mandate, legal authority, and 
resources needed both to expand space cooperation in their own domain, and to coordinate more 
effectively across space issue areas. 
 
Many types of space cooperation advocated as measures to protect the global commons or 
enhance strategic stability would receive greater international support if they were pursued as 
part of a broader Space Governance for Global Security strategy. Users would be more inclined 
to protect the space environment if collaborative projects increased stakeholders’ net benefits 
from space, and strengthened their sensitivity to social norms. If voluntary self-regulation was 
deemed inadequate, it would be much easier to get international agreement outlawing destructive 
ASAT operations and other activities that pose high risk to the space environment if this was 
coupled with correspondingly strong rules addressing related aspects of space security. Efforts to 
improve space surveillance could be more comprehensive, at less cost to the United States, and 
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with less concern that the information might be misused for military advantage, if all space-
faring countries and satellite operators contributed on an equitable basis to establish a 
geographically distributed network of sensors feeding into an international data center 
responsible both for providing space users with information needed for safe, efficient operations, 
and for monitoring compliance with space security accords. 
 
On the surface, this way of framing the logic for space cooperation sounds radically idealistic 
compared to recent U.S. policy and to the minimalist forms of space security cooperation that 
most American analysts currently consider politically viable. But, it would be directly in line 
with the OST principles that the United States initially championed as the most reliable way to 
protect and promote those uses of space deemed most important to U.S. security. A return to 
robust reciprocal restraint followed by a concerted effort to negotiate stronger legal protections 
for satellites and prohibitions on the testing or deployment of ASAT weapons would enjoy 
strong public approval in the United States, and even greater support in other countries.43 
Building a strategy for space governance around the three shared objectives identified above 
would be consistent with the proclaimed orientation of every space power. It would also hold 
great appeal for the countless state and non-state actors who want benefits from space, but do not 
have their own space programs, and thus, have very little power over space developments that 
affect their lives. 
 
On deeper reflection, there are good reasons to believe that if it made a concerted effort, the 
Obama Administration could generate widespread support among different segments of the 
space community for a policy that better balanced commercial, civilian, and military interests, 
and that used international cooperation both to share the costs and benefits of peaceful space 
operations, and to reduce all hazards to space systems. The commercial and civilian space 
communities would certainly endorse these goals, although private space actors would resist 
regulations if they were unnecessarily top-down, and would want to join governmental 
representatives in making decisions that directly affected their commercial space operations. 
Even most of the military might support this reframing because they care more about preserving 
U.S. access to space for terrestrial military support and intelligence purposes than they do about 
denying other countries access to space or putting weapons there. 
 
The United States military would have to foreclose some options and give up some freedom of 
action in space in return for stronger legal protections for permitted uses of space and reciprocal 
restraints on what other countries could do there. But much of what the United States would give 
up would be things that it is highly unlikely to do anyways for technical, economic, and strategic 
reasons, such as deploying a space-based layer of missile defense interceptors. Therefore, it 
should reap the political and security benefits from making reassuring commitments. Few U.S. 
military, space, or security experts regret that the OST ruled out orbiting WMD and putting 
military bases on the Moon. They would more likely feel relief than regret if a companion 
agreement precluded anybody from putting terrestrial strike weapons in space for another fifty 
years. Other things that the United States might be tempted to do now in extreme circumstances, 
such as disabling an adversary’s space-based military communication or satellite-imagery assets 
at the outset of a war, will appear increasingly undesirable as more states and non-state actors 





Much of what the Obama Administration is trying to do in the commercial and civilian 
components of its new National Space Policy would fit well with this approach, such as 
reforming the U.S. export control system so that it is easier to sell non-military satellites and to 
work with foreigners on the International Space Station (ISS), while also trying to persuade other 
countries with space technologies that pose a true security risk not to sell or share them with 
those who might misuse them. In the military side of space policy, the publicly discussed 
concept that comes closest to this logic is the systematic promotion of “selective 
interdependence.” This phrase suggests that for certain space applications, such as environmental 
monitoring or missile warning, the United States could work with other countries to build more 
capable systems, while sharing the costs and benefits, such that all users would have strong 
incentives to protect the system and to respond vigorously against anyone who attacked it. The 
more selective the United States is, though, both in the kinds of space activities where this 
concept is applied and the number of partners included, the less beneficial it will be. And 
recognizing the strategic value of selective interdependence is but the first intellectual step 
towards understanding the kinds of global governance arrangements needed to manage complex 






The most important step in strategic thinking is correctly defining the structure of the problem to 
be addressed by cooperation or unilateral action. The Obama Administration has clearly 
indicated that it wants more international cooperation than its predecessor did, both in space and 
in its overall national security strategy. But it does not seem to have a clear conception of the 
kind of cooperation it wants in space, nor a viable strategy for persuading other countries to work 
with it on measures that would be strong and comprehensive enough to get the desired results. 
Even as it tries to differentiate itself from Bush-era policies, the Obama Administration still 
seems conceptually limited to narrow, negative logics for space cooperation that fit within the 
boundaries of political acceptability during the previous administration. The way to break out of 
this intellectual box is to think seriously about what it would mean to apply the guiding 
principles of the 2010 National Security Strategy systematically and comprehensively to global 
space governance. 
 
Some U.S. strategists will object that no matter how much the United States and the rest of the 
world might gain in absolute terms by cooperating to secure the space domain for peaceful use, 
to protect space assets from all hazards, and to derive maximum value from space for security, 
economic, civil, and environmental ends, the United States should not do anything that would 
constrain its freedom of action, or reduce the relative advantages that it currently enjoys. This 
objection is understandable, but outmoded. U.S. asymmetrical advantages in space are matched 
by asymmetrical vulnerabilities, and the United States cannot unilaterally protect all of its 
satellites or prevent others from acquiring the means to threaten them, even if it dramatically 
increased military space spending and ended all space-related exports and civilian cooperation. 
Mutual vulnerability is an inescapable feature of global security, so promoting widespread 
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adherence to equitable rules that regulate behavior, reduce risks, and provide reassurance in 
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